Mere delay in the proceedings is not
tantamount to a violation of the right
to speedy disposition of cases or
speedy trial

Likewise paramount in the administration of justice is the resolution of cases with dispatch. This lends credence to the truism that justice delayed is justice denied.[35]

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution unequivocally guarantees
"[a]ll persons x x x the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

Courts and administrative bodies are constitutionally-mandated to resolve matters before them with speed and efficiency.[36] The expeditious resolution of controversies is even more required in criminal cases because an accused is guaranteed the right to have a speedy trial under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Equally important as these rights, however, is the State's duty and interest in prosecuting charges. In view of this, the rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial, albeit regarded as sacrosanct, are not elixirs that guarantee reprieve upon invocation without qualification.

Hence, when a case calls for the determination of whether these rights are violated, the Court is duty-bound to carefully cast a pragmatic balance between these fundamental interests. To that end, certain principles have been adopted and developed over time to aid the Court in the intricate task of harmonizing such significant societal concerns.

BALANCING TEST

In the earlier case of Martin v. Ver,[37] we first adopted the "balancing test" in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and/or speedy disposition of cases has been violated based on the landmark ruling of Barker v. Wingo.[38]

The test compels an ad hoc approach, where in the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are assessed in light of the four-fold factors, to wit:

(1) length of delay;

(2) reason for the delay;

(3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of the right; and

(4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.

In Remulla v. Sandiganbayan,[39] we noted that "[n]one of these elements x x x is either a necessary or sufficient condition [on their own as] they are related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances."[40]

In the more recent case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[41] we laid down definitive guidelines in resolving issues involving the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases, synthesized as follows:

[I]nordinate delay in there solution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case.If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.[42](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, a finding of delay in the proceedings does not necessarily evince a violation of the right to speedy disposition of a case or speedy trial to warrant the outright dismissal of the case. Essentially, these rights are relative and flexible concepts, which require particular regard of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

Invocation of these rights must be consistent with reasonable delay as they are deemed violated only when there is inordinate delay, such as in proceedings attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; those unjustifiably postponed; or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having their case tried.[43] As well, it should be noted that, like any other right, the rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial may be waived. Hence, if proven through established jurisprudential standards that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.[44]

end of part 1